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Abstract In this paper, we explore the synergies and tradeoffs between abatement of global
and local pollution. We build a unique dataset of Swedish combined heat and power plants
with detailed boiler-level data 2001–2009 on not only production and inputs but also on
emissions of CO2 and NOx. Both pollutants are regulated by strict policies in Sweden. CO2
is subject to theEuropeanUnionEmissionTradingScheme andSwedish carbon taxes;NOx—
as a precursor of acid rain and eutrophication—is regulated by a heavy fee. Using a quadratic
directional output distance function, we characterize changes in technical efficiency as well
as patterns of substitutability in response to the policies mentioned. The fact that generating
units face a trade-off between the pollutants indicates the need for policy coordination.
Keywords Environmental policies · Shadow pricing · Directional distance function ·
Climate change · Local pollution · Policy interactions
JEL Classification H23 · L51 · L94 · L98 · Q48
1 Introduction
Climate policy is affected by multiple decision makers at local, national, and international
levels. Usually these decisionmakers are not fully coordinated in terms of goals andmethods,
and the existence of several layers of governance may encourage strategic behavior from
powerful local actors trying to enhance their own positions (Caillaud et al. 1996). Multi-
level climate policy governance is also related to governance of local air pollutants since
production processes often involve emitting several air pollutants simultaneously and most
emission control measures affect more than one pollutant. Environmental policies aiming
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at reducing CO2 emissions might therefore create spillovers, i.e., reductions or increases in
emissions of other pollutants by firms changing or modifying their production processes in
response to climate policy. For example, a common strategy to reduce CO2 emissions is
switching the fuel mix from fuel oil to biofuels, which are counted as having zero carbon.
However, although such a transition may make CO2 emissions fall dramatically, biofuels
often imply an increase in nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide
(CO), and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions (Brännlund and Kriström 2001).
Spillovers from climate policy have important implications for policy design since they
affect the cost of climate regulations. Theory shows that one critical factor determining
whether an increased stringency of climate policies leads to increased emission of local
pollutants is the elasticity of substitution (e.g., Ambec and Coria 2013). If pollutants are
substitutes, CO2 emissions will be reduced at the expense of increased emissions of local
pollutants. If they are complements, climate policies might lead to ancillary benefits since
local pollutants will then be reduced alongside CO2 emissions. There is also the effect
of technological development, which generally decreases the emissions of all pollutants.
Therefore, emissions of pollutants that are substitutes to CO2 can still fall with climate policy
if technological development outweighs the substitution effect. In this paper, we characterize
changes in the relative performance of Swedish combined heat and power plants with respect
to CO2 andNOx emissions in response to variations in the level of stringency of CO2 andNOx
policies and multiple layers of regulation. In particular, we study the effects of the interaction
between the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the Swedish CO2
tax and refundable charge on NOx emissions with the goal of determining whether multi-
level climate policy governance has generated ancillary benefits or costs in terms of NOx
emissions. To this end, we built a unique dataset of Swedish combined heat and power plants
for the period 2001–2009 consisting of detailed boiler-level data on not only production and
inputs but also CO2 and NOx emissions. We estimate a quadratic directional output distance
function to study and compare patterns of technical progress, substitution between CO2 and
NOx, and shadow prices of these pollutants in the period 2001–2004 (before introduction of
the EU ETS) and 2005–2009 (post-implementation).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study analyzing and quantifying the effects
of the multi-governance of climate change policy and its interaction with the other national
policy instruments aimed to reduce local pollutants. However, some previous studies have
employed directional output distance functions to analyze the shadow cost of environmental
regulations (see e.g., Färe et al. 2005; Marklund and Samakovlis 2007; Wei et al. 2013; Du
et al. 2015a, b) and the technological non-separability and substitutability among air and
water pollutants (see e.g., Murty et al. 2007; Kumar and Managi 2011; Färe et al. 2012).
Notably, Agee et al. (2014) estimate a multiple-input, multiple-output directional output
distance function to analyze the technological non-separability in the control of CO2 and
NOx emissions of the U.S. electric utilities’ sector and its implications for the design of a
CO2 emissions cap and trade system. They find that controlling one pollutant also controls the
other, and hence there are ancillary benefits from policies targeted at reducing one of them.
Their results are consistent with those of Burtraw et al. (2003), who employ an electricity
market equilibrium model to simulate changes in emissions resulting from different climate
policy scenarios and find considerable (health-related) ancillary benefits due to reduced NOx
emissions.
Our work differs from previous studies in two important ways. First, we focus on policy-
induced substitutability across pollutants and the changes in relative shadow prices of
emissions introduced by environmental multi-level governance. Second, we analyze the case
of Sweden who has been at the forefront of CO2 emission reduction for a long time, and it
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is one of the few countries whose present level of emissions is below the level recorded in
1990. This accomplishment is mainly explained by the remarkable expansion of biofuel use,
which has the potential negative side effect of increasing NOx emissions. Hence, compared
with the U.S., where switching from high-carbon fuels (like coal and oil) to reduced-carbon
ones such as natural gas is still an option, in Sweden most emission reductions have already
been undertaken. Our results indicate that there are limits to the positive spillovers (i.e., ancil-
lary benefits) from climate policy as countries approach the goal of a carbon-free economy.
Furthermore, the existence of spillovers indicates the need for better coordination across
policymakers at different levels of governance, and policy coordination becomes even more
important under substitutability since the unintended costs of climate policy on local pol-
lution can make it less acceptable to the public and policymakers. This is particularly the
case since the benefits from reduced climate change mostly accrue in the long term and on
a global scale, while any ancillary costs of climate policy would tend to accrue in the near
term, affecting the countries undertaking mitigation action.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the climate and NOx policy
in Sweden and the changes in the relative price of CO2/NOx over the period 2001–2009.
Section 3 presents the theoretical and empirical framework of the joint production of heat
and power, CO2 and NOx emissions. Section 4 discusses the data and empirical results and
analyzes the sensitivity of our results to different directional vectors. Section 5 discusses
some policy implications and Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2 Climate and NOx Policy for Combined Heat and Power Plants in
Sweden: Carbon Taxation, EU ETS, and the Refundable NOx Charge
Combined heat and power (hereinafter CHP) is the simultaneous generation of useful heat
and power from a single fuel or energy source at or close to the point of use. As in all
combustion processes, CO2 emissions produced byCHPdependmainly on the carbon content
of the fuel, while NOx emissions and the interactions between measures to control CO2
and NOx emissions vary according to the design characteristics of the individual plants.
For instance, compression-ignition engines generally operate with lower air-to-fuel ratios
and higher combustion temperatures, which results in higher NOx emissions per unit of
power generated. Alternatively, the use of spark-ignition gas engines operated on natural gas
would enable CHP to reduce NOx emissions, albeit with a small increase in CO2 emissions.
Moreover, NOx is produced largely from an unintended chemical reaction between nitrogen
and oxygen in the combustion chamber. The process is quite non-linear in temperature and
other parameters of the combustion process, which implies that there is a large scope for
NOx reduction through various technical measures. For example, it is possible to reduce
NOx emissions by operating at lower engine efficiency or through the investment in post-
combustion technologies (PCTs) that clean up NOx once it has been formed. However, such
technologies usually require energy and thus will increase CO2 emissions (at least relative to
output). It is also possible to invest in combustion technologies (CTs) involving the optimal
control of combustion parameters (temperature, pressure, stoichiometry, flame stability and
homogeneity, and flue gas residence time) to inhibit the formation of thermal and prompt
NOx. The adoption of these technologies clearly depends on the investment costs, which have
shown to be boiler and plant specific and vary with boiler capacity (Linn 2008). Moreover,
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some technologies are not commercially available below certain size thresholds (Sterner and
Turnheim 2009).1
Since most emission control measures employed by CHP plants affect both CO2 and NOx
emissions, one should observe some changes in pollutants’ substitutability in response to
the variations in the level of stringency of CO2 and NOx policies and multiple layers of
regulations.2 Therefore, in order to develop a hypothesis regarding the relative incentives to
reduce CO2 and NOx emissions, respectively, we start by briefly describing climate and NOx
policies in Sweden and the evolution of the relative cost of CO2/NOx per unit of output over
the period 2001–2009 (for a detailed description of Swedish environmental policy see SEPA
2007).
In 1991, Sweden introduced a carbon tax that is directly connected to the carbon content of
the fuel. Initially, the tax was equivalent to 25e/metric ton of CO2. After increasing steadily
over the last decade, it currently corresponds to 105 e/ton.3 Since the tax is very high and
Sweden is a small open economy, there has been concern for the competitiveness of some
energy-intensive industries. Thus, a number of deductions and exemptions have been created
in those sectors that are open to competition, and a series of reduced tax rates have been
introduced. In the case of the heat and power sector, the carbon tax varies according to the
type of generation, i.e., whether the generating unit is a CHP boiler or an only-heat boiler.
From 2005 to June 2008, the carbon tax and the EU ETS overlapped. At that point, the tax
was essentially replaced with the EU ETS, and CHP plants were granted a tax reduction of
85%. Since the level of the price of CO2 allowances is much lower than the Swedish tax level,
this harmonization with the EU actually has implied a sizeable fall in the price of carbon
emissions for most CHP plants.
The tax reform of 1991 introduced not only a carbon tax but also other taxes including
a high fee on NOx. The fee was initially confined to NOx emissions from electricity and
heat-producing boilers, stationary combustion engines, and gas turbines with a useful energy
production4 of at least 50 gigawatt hours (GWh) per year (approx. 182 boilers). However,
because of its effectiveness in reducing emissions and simultaneously falling monitoring
costs, in 1996 the charge system was extended to include all boilers producing at least
40GWh of useful energy per year, and in 1997 the limit was again lowered to 25GWh.
1 PCTs consist of flue gas treatments designed to clean up NOx once it has been formed, usually through
conversion to benign chemical species. Examples include: (1) SCR (selective catalytic reduction), which is
rather costly to install but achieves highly efficient reduction levels, and (2) SNCR (selective non-catalytic
reduction of chemicals, e.g., ammonia, urea, and sodium bicarbonate), which is less costly than SCR in both
capital and operating costs but also less effective.
2 The adoption of CO2 and NOx emission control technologies does not necessarily imply a change in the
relative technical efficiency of the generating units because the efficiency scores are computed relative to the
performance of a best-practice frontier, but the fact that multiple regulations are into play motivate us also to
explore this as an empirical question in Sect. 5.1.
3 This is by all accounts a very high carbon tax. To put it in context, the carbon dioxide permits on U.S.
markets such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and Chicago are trading at around 4 e/ton;
the EU ETS has varied around a mean of 15–20 e/ton; and France has tried to introduce a carbon tax of 17
e/ton—but has failed because of fears that such a level would be detrimental to the economy.
4 “Useful energy” is the output variable of the NOx charge system that measures the total energy production
from the heterogeneous group of regulated industries (heat and power, waste, wood, pulp and paper, chemical,
metal, and food industry). For CHP plants and only-heat plants “useful energy” is the energy sold in the form
of heat or electricity. For other industries, “useful energy” is the energy in the form of steam, hot water or
electricity produced in the boiler and used in production processes or heating of factory buildings (see Sterner
and Höglund 2006 for details).
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The total fees are refunded to the participating plants5 in proportion to their production
of useful energy. Hence, the system encourages plants to reduce NOx emissions per unit of
energy to the largest possible extent, since plants with lower emissions relative to energy
output are net receivers of the refund. The fee was originally set at 4.3e/kg, which is an
extremely high level compared to other countries. 6
The Swedish NOx fee has been evaluated extensively (see e.g., Höglund 2005; Sterner
and Höglund 2006; Sterner and Turnheim 2009; Bonilla et al. 2015). It has been shown to
be very effective in lowering emissions. Empirical findings suggest that extensive emission
reductions have taken place due to learning and technological development in abatement.
Nevertheless, emissions fell mostly in the early years. The decrease has continued since
then, but at a reduced pace. Hence, as the impact of the charge seemed to diminish, in 2008
the Swedish government decided to raise the fee to 5.3e/kg to foster further adoption of
more effective treatment techniques (SEPA 2003, 2007, 2009).
How have the regulations described above affected the relative cost of CO2/NOx emis-
sions? To assess the overall picture is not altogether easy. Although large industrial plants in
the energy sector can to some extent adjust their technology in response to short-run price
variations (e.g., through fuel switching), many features of their design take a decade to build
and are adapted to expected price trends over a longer time horizon (e.g., the ability to switch
fuels may well be one such feature). Furthermore, the carbon tax paid and allowances used
depend on the type of fuel being burned, which is endogenous to the stringency of CO2
policies in previous years.7 To provide an indication of the relative stringency of CO2 and
NOx policies, we compute the relative cost of CO2 and NOx emissions per unit of output for
the CHP plants in our data (see Fig. 1). The cost of CO2 emissions is calculated as the sum of
the CO2 tax plus the EU ETS price, while the cost of NOx emissions corresponds to the fee
on NOx. As shown in Fig. 1, it seems clear that over the period 2001–2009, policy signals in
Sweden told power companies to avoid fossil fuels. The cost of emitting CO2 is much higher
than the cost of emitting NOx. For example, in 2003, an average CHP plant emitted 0.082
tons of CO2 and 0.248kg of NOx to produce 1MWh of useful energy. Given the magnitude
of the carbon tax and NOx fee at that time, this implied a cost of 6.116 and 0.936e/MWh
for CO2 and NOx emissions, respectively. This is to say that the cost of CO2 emissions per
unit of output was over six times the cost of NOx emissions.
The variation observed in Fig. 1 suggests that CO2 policy did become less stringent
(relative to NOx) due to the carbon tax phase-out. Indeed, the reduction began already in 2004
when CHP plants were granted a significant carbon tax reduction.8 Furthermore, Sweden
5 With the exception of 0.7% that is kept for administration costs. The refund varies from year to year, but in
recent years it has been around 0.9e/megawatt hour (MWh) of useful energywhile the averageNOx emissions
per unit of energy has been 0.23kg of NOx per MWh.
6 This number corresponds to 4300e/ton, which can be compared with the Taxe Parafiscale in France of
40.85e/ton and the Norwegian fee of 525e/ton.
7 As described by Färe et al. (2016), in a given period the opportunity costs of abatement depends on the choice
of inputs and technology available at that point in time. Figure 1 plots the relative cost of CO2/NOx emissions
per MWh. We calculated the relative cost per boiler per year (as each boiler uses a different combination of
inputs and technology, which determines the opportunity cost) and then averaged the relative cost of CO2/NOx
emissions per MWh across boilers. Thus, we compute the average value of the relative cost across boilers.
8 Specifically, CHP plants about to be regulated by the EU ETSwere only required to pay 21% of the CO2 tax.
We acknowledge that in terms of measuring the effect of variations in the CO2/NOx, the periods 2001–2003
and 2004–2009 can be interesting. Nevertheless, the objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of multi-
governance and overlapping of policies, and therefore, we focus on the comparison of the periods 2001–2004
and 2005–2009.
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Fig. 1 Relative cost of CO2/NOx emissions per MWh for CHP plants. Note The cost of CO2 emissions is
calculated as the sum of the carbon tax plus the CO2 EU ETS price (mean of forward contracts 2007–2013).
We compute the relative cost of CO2/NOx emissions perMWh per boiler and average the values across boilers
increased the fee on NOx for all regulated boilers in 2008, adding to the effect of the reduced
carbon tax on the relative cost of CO2/NOx.
A clear hypothesis to be derived from the analysis above is that firms should direct most
abatement efforts to reducing CO2 emissions as the economic effect of CO2 regulations on
firms’ profitability (taking into account both abatement costs and abatement benefits through
reduced pollution payments) is much higher than that of NOx regulations. Moreover, the
variations in the relative cost of CO2/NOx emissions should have induced some variations
in the relative CO2/NOx abatement efforts if generating units were to minimize the cost of
compliance with environmental regulations. The magnitude and direction of the changes in
the optimal mix of CO2/NOx emissions would depend, however, on a series of factors such
as technological development and whether CO2 and NOx are substitutes or complements
in abatement. For instance, in the absence of technological development, one would expect
emissions of NOx from CHPs to decrease relatively more in 2005–2009 than 2001–2004
if pollutants are substitutes, while the reverse holds if pollutants are complements. On the
other hand, the high relative cost of reducing CO2 emissions should have also triggered
technological fixes and fuel switching aiming to reduce them. Hence, given the relative
stringency of CO2/NOx regulations, we would expect technological efforts to be overall
biased towards CO2 emission reductions. In the next sections, we use a quadratic directional
output distance function to derive the relative shadow prices of emissions for each generating
unit and analyze the changes on technical efficiency and abatement efforts induced by the
regulatory changes, but first we will describe the estimation strategy.
3 Estimation Strategy
One of the main objectives of this paper is to quantitatively characterize the degree of substi-
tutability or complementarity between reductions of CO2 and NOx emissions. The technical
efficiency literature provides a variety of methods to evaluate the performance of the gen-
erating units, including nonparametric and parametric approaches. Since substitutability is
associated with the curvature along the output possibilities set (see Färe et al. 2005), in
our approach we employ a parametric directional output distance function that is twice dif-
ferentiable to derive estimates of elasticities of substitution output/pollutants and between
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pollutants.9 We also estimate technical efficiencies and absolute and relative shadow prices
of CO2/NOx.
In the past, researchers have first estimated a production function frontier and then the
distances of individual plants from the frontier. The function used here seeks the simultaneous
expansion of good outputs and contraction of bad outputs, which is very suitable to our case.
Modeling the technology in this manner allows for the adoption of abatement measures in
order to reduce the bad outputs (emissions) and still increase, or hold constant, the production
of heat and power.
Following Färe et al. (2005), we treat emissions as bad or undesirable outputs generated
in the boilers’ combustion process and model jointly the production of heat and power and
emissions. Let the set of output possibilities P(x) = {(y, b): x can produce (y, b)} represent
all feasible input–output possibilities of boilers that jointly generate heat and power (y) and
a vector of emissions b = (b1, b2) (where b1 represents emissions of CO2 and b2 represents
emissions of NOx) using an input vector x = (x1, x2, x3) containing installed capacity, fuel
consumption (as input energy) and labor, respectively. We assume that inputs are strongly
disposable, which implies that the output set is not shrinking if the inputs are expanding.
Furthermore, we assume null-jointness, implying that no good output is produced without a
positive amount of at least one of the bad outputs. Moreover, all outputs are assumed to be
jointly weakly disposable, implying that bad outputs are not freely disposable and cannot be
reduced without affecting the production of good outputs, i.e., through the diversion of inputs
into pollution reduction. Finally, we consider that the good output is strongly disposable,
implying that if an observed good and bad output vector is feasible, then any output vector
with less of the good output is also feasible (i.e., good outputs are freely disposable since
they have a nonnegative value). The directional output distance function is characterized as
D0(x, y, b; g) = max
{
γ : (y + γ gy, b1 − γ gb1 , b2 − γ gb2
) ∈ P(x)} . (1)
Equation (1) is a functional representation of the technology that is consistent with P(x)
and its associated properties. The solution γ ∗ = Do(x, y, b; g) corresponds to the maximum
expansion and contraction of good and bad outputs, respectively. The directional vector
g = (gy, gb1 , gb2
)
specifies in which direction the good and bad outputs are scaled so as to
reach the boundary of the output set at
(
b1 − γ ∗gb1 , b2 − γ ∗gb2 , y + γ ∗gy
)
.
The directional output distance function has several properties listed below (see Färe et al.
2005):
(1) Do(x, y, b; g) ≥ 0 if and only if (y, b) is an element of P(x)
(2) Do
(
x, y′, b; g) ≥ Do(x, y, b; g) for
(
y′, b
) ≤ (y, b) ∈ P(x)
(3) Do
(
x, y, b′; g) ≥ Do(x, y, b; g) for
(
y, b′
) ≥ (y, b) ∈ P(x)
(4) Do
(
x ′, y, b; g) ≥ Do(x, y, b; g) for x ′ ≥ x ∈ P(x)
(5) Do(x, y, b; g) is concave in (y, b) ∈ P(x)
(6) Do (x, λy, λb; g) ≥ 0 for (y, b) ∈ P(x) and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
(7) If Do (x, y, 0; g) < 0 for y > 0, then (y, 0) /∈ P(x)
(8) Do
(
x, y + ρgy, b1 − ρgb1 , b2 − ρgb2; g
) = Do(x, y, b; g) − ρ, ρ ∈ ,
Property (1) points out that Do(x, y, b; g) is non-negative for feasible output vectors. Thus,
the function takes the value of zero for generating units with efficient output vectors on the
9 An advantage of a nonparametric method such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is that it does not
restrict the directional distance function to any particular functional form (Førsund et al. 2007; Hjalmarsson
et al. 1996), However, as discussed by Førsund and Hjalmarsson (1983) a piecewise linear frontier is not
differentiable, not being suited for computing elasticities of substitution between pollutants.
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boundary of P(x) or takes positive values for generating units operating inefficiently below
the boundary. Higher values of Do(x, y, b; g) indicate higher inefficiency. Do(x, y, b; g)
also satisfies monotonicity: (2) indicates that it is non-increasing in good output, (3) states
that it is non-decreasing in undesirable outputs, and (4) points out that it is non-decreasing in
inputs. Property (5) indicates that the output set frontier is concave in good and bad outputs.
Do(x, y, b; g) also satisfies (6) weak disposability of good output and bad outputs, and (7)
null jointness. Additionally, the directional output distance function satisfies the translation
property. Under this property, which corresponds to expression (8), the inefficiency can
decrease by the amount of ρ if bad outputs are contracted by ρgb1 and ρgb2 , and the good
output is expanded by ρgy .
We specify our directional output distance function with a quadratic form to ensure that
the frontier is a twice differentiable function.10 For a generating unit k operating at period t ,







































































k + τt + ς f , (2)
where k = 1, 2, . . . , K ; t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; τt are fixed effects per year and ς f are fixed effects
per firm. In order to estimate the directional output distance function in (2), we minimize
the sum of the deviations of the estimated distance function from the efficient value of zero,
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(4) ∂ Dto
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x, y, b; g) /∂xn = αn+αnnxtnk + 12
∑
n′ 
=n(αnn′ + αn′n) xtn′k +
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i=1ηni btik +





































β1gy − ∑2i=1θi gbi = −1, β2gy −
∑2
i=1μi gbi = 0, μi gy −
∑2
i ′=1θi i ′gbi ′ = 0 and
δngy − ∑2i=1ηni gbi = 0,∀i, n.
(9) αnn′ = αn′nwith n, n′ = 1, 2, 3 and n 
= n′. θi i ′ = θi ′i for i, i ′ = 1, 2 and i 
= i ′.
10 We chose the generalized quadratic function as it also has additional suitable properties from the econo-
metric and economic point of view. Besides including both first and second order terms (which allows twice
differentiability) this specification is linear in the parameters and it is the only specification that yields a
second-order Taylor’s series approximation to arbitrary functions consistent with the translation property of
the directional distance function (Chambers et al. 2013; Färe et al. 2010; Hailu and Chambers 2012).
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In this parametric specification we have also imposed through expression (9) cross-output
and cross-input symmetry conditions. In Tables 5 and 6 in the “Appendix” we assess the
monotonicity conditions, null-jointness property and concavity of the output set frontier.
3.1 Shadow Prices
When pollutants are considered as bad outputs, it is usual to interpret the values of the
directional output distance function as ameasure of the combined environmental and technical
efficiency. The reason for this is that given the level of inputs, the function besides allowing
increases in the good output, it also accounts for environmental efficiency as it enables
simultaneous decreases in pollutants (see Färe et al. 2005). The directional output distance
function approach allows us, however, to not only account for technical and environmental
efficiency, but also calculate the shadow prices of CO2 and NOx emissions and the elasticity
of substitution between these pollutants. Indeed, since the directional output distance function
Do (x, y, b; g) describes the technology, the revenue function can be written as
R(x, p, q) = max
y,b1,b2
{
py − q1b1 − q2b2: Do (x, y, b; g) ≥ 0
}
where q = (q1, q2) denotes the emissions price vector containing CO2 and NOx shadow
prices, respectively, and p denotes the output price. Chambers et al. (1998) show that the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximization of revenues corresponds to λ = pgy +
q1gb1 + q2gb2 . Hence, the revenue function can be characterized as
R(x, p, q) = max
y,b1,b2
{
py − q1b1 − q2b2 +
(
pgy + q1gb1 + q2gb2
) Do (x, y, b; g)
}
.
The corresponding first order conditions with regard to y, b1 and b2 are
(
pgy + q1gb1 + q2gb2
)
Dy = −p, (3)(
pgy + q1gb1 + q2gb2
)
Db1 = q1, (4)(
pgy + q1gb1 + q2gb2
)
Db2 = q2, (5)
where Dy and Dbi are the first order derivatives of Do (x, y, b; g)with respect to good output
and pollutant bi , respectively.
The ratio between Eqs. (4) and (5) provides us with the relative shadow price of pollution,







Moreover, we can obtain the absolute shadow prices of pollution (i.e., the marginal loss in
CHP production necessary to reduce CO2 or NOx emissions) from the ratio between Eqs. (4)
and (3) and (5) and (3):
qi = −p Dbi
Dy
. (7)
11 For a detailed explanation of the shadow prices approach in the context of the output distance function, see
Färe et al. (1993). For applications in the case of directional output distance functions, see Färe et al. (2001,
2005).
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3.2 Morishima Elasticities of Substitution
The Morishima elasticity of substitution provides us with information on how much the
relative shadow prices of outputs will change in response to changes in emission intensities
(see Blackorby and Russell 1981, 1989). In the context of the technology described by the
directional output distance function, the indirectMorishima elasticity of substitution between
























where Db1b2 , Db2b2 , Dbi y , and Dyy are second order derivatives of the directional output dis-
tance function, y∗ = y + Do (x, y, b; g) gy and b∗i = bi − Do (x, y, b; g) gbi . If Mb1b2 > 0,
then b1 and b2 are Morishima substitutes. That is, the pollutants are substitutes if the emis-
sion intensity (b2/b1) increases when the relative shadow price (q2/q1) decreases; emission
reductions in b1 are accompanied by increased emissions in b2. Conversely, b1 and b2 are
complements when Mb1b2 < 0.
Note that Mbi y ≤ 0 since Do (x, y, b; g) satisfies monotonicity and concavity proper-



















depends critically on the sign and magnitude of θ12.
In particular, for b∗2 > 0, it holds that b1 and b2 are Morishima substitutes if
• θ12 > 0 or


























TheMorishima elasticities of substitution show that a percentage change in the price ratio
q1/q2 (motivated for instance by an increase in q1) has two effects on the quantity ratio:
the first term shows the effect on b1 while the second term shows the effect on b2. There-
fore, despite the fact that symmetry conditions for cross-output ensure that θ12 = θ21, the
12 sign Mbi y = y∗
[−+ − −−
]
≤ 0 for y∗ > 0.
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Morishima elasticities are inherently asymmetric (Mb1b2 
= Mb2b1) since they represent the
difference between two elasticities: a cross elasticity and own price elasticity. In terms of
the analysis, the asymmetric substitutability tells us which pollutant is easier to substitute
for another pollutant for a fixed amount of output. Note that a lower value of the Morishima
elasticities of substitution indicates greater substitution possibilities between pollutants. The
intuition behind this is that to generate the same change in the emission intensity (b2/b1),
a smaller change in the prices (q1/q2) is required when the pollutants are close substitutes.
Likewise, lower pollution-good output elasticities in absolute value indicate greater substi-
tution possibilities.
We estimate the directional output distance function using a deterministic method, i.e.,
parametric linear programming (PLP) that allows us to impose parametric restrictions that
are a result of the underlying technology such as monotonicity in good or bad outputs. We
followAigner and Chu’s (1968) procedure of minimizing the sum of the distance between the
frontier technology and the actual observations of the generating units in each period. Hence,
the method chooses the parameters that make the generating units as efficient as possible
subject to a set of restrictions associated with the technology properties already described
(see Färe et al. 2001, 2005, 2006).
Note that the choice of directional vector g = (gy, gb1 , gb2
)
affects the magnitude of the
first and second order derivatives of the directional distance function through the constraints
(8). As in Färe et al. (2006), our choice of directional vector is g = (1, 1, 1), i.e., the
component of the good output and the components of the two pollutants are equal to one,
making the model parsimonious. In Sect. 5.5 we develop a sensitivity analysis estimating the
directional distance function in Eq. (2) for two additional direction sets.
We derive estimates of the coefficients for pre- (2001–2004) and post- (2005–2009) EU
ETS implementation.Wewrote the code to solve the optimization problem inMatlab. In order
to avoid convergence problems in the algorithm, all variables are expressed in normalized
values, i.e., each output and input is divided by its own sample mean.13 Year and firm fixed
effects (τt and ς f ) are estimated using a set of yearly and firm dummy variables. These vari-
ables take the value of one if the observation belongs to year t or firm f , accordingly; and zero
otherwise. In the case of the yearly dummies, the reference year corresponds to the first year
for each period of analysis (e.g., 2001 for pre-EU ETS and 2005 for post-EU ETS). Regard-
ing the firm dummies, we chose arbitrarily a firm as the reference firm for both periods.14
All the dummy variables (except those representing the reference cases) are included in the
objective function of the minimization problem to carry out the estimations. Using the esti-
mated coefficients of the directional output distance function, we compute the technical and
environmental efficiencies and the Morishima elasticities of substitution between pollutants
and between pollutants and output according to Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively. The relative
and absolute shadow prices are obtained by applying Eqs. (6) and (7). To identify changes in
efficiencies, elasticities, and relative shadow prices before and after the implementation of the
EU ETS, we compare the density functions of these measures between periods. To this end,
we employ kernel-basedmethods to statistically test the difference between distributions. Our
13 Note that the choice of a unit vector g is equivalent to set the direction equal to the sample average of
inputs, good and bad outputs when the data is normalized by the sample mean.
14 Given that the regressions are estimated with intercept, our model included 34 firm dummies. The purpose
of including those variables is to control for unobserved factors at the firm level that are constant over time
(either 2001–2004 or 2005–2009) which may affect the technical and environmental efficiency.
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tests are conducted by computing the nonparametric Tn-statistic of Li et al. (2009)15 which
assesses the equality between two density functions. Let f (x) and g(x) denote the density
functions of a random variable x . We test the null hypothesis that f (x) = g(x) against the
alternative hypothesis that f (x) 
= g(x). Following Hayfield and Racine (2008, 2011), we
implement this procedure in the software R with 500 bootstrap repetitions and estimate the
Tn-statistic using a standard normal kernel. The empirical p values of the consistent density
equality test are computed after bootstrapping.
4 Data
Our analysis models production and emissions at the boiler level in the heat and power sector
using data for the Swedish CHP plants during 2001–2009. We focus on CHP plants since
approximately 75% of the plants in the heat and power sector belong to this group. Moreover,
CHP plants have been promoted within the European Union as an effective means to increase
the overall energy efficiency (EUDirective 2004/8/EC).16 In Sweden approximately 30–50%
of the total input energy of a CHP is converted to electricity and the rest to heat (Svensk
Fjärrvärme 2011). Though we would have liked to develop the analysis by disaggregating
production into heat and power, the information available at the boiler level only allows us
to analyze the joint production. Hence, our measure of good output is the amount of useful
energy (MWh) commercially sold. This is the sum of electrical energy and process heat in
those cases where this heat is sold (generally for district heating17) or used in industrial
processes. The two undesirable outputs, CO2 and NOx emissions, are expressed in metric
tons, and as stated above, the inputs consist of installed capacity (MW),18 fuel consumption
(MWh),19 and labor (number of employees). NOx emissions and useful energy are taken from
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency’s (SEPA) NOx charge database. These two
variables are measured and reported to the SEPA directly by the generating units along with
information about energy fuel shares, installed capacity, and the available NOx combustion
and post-combustion technologies (CTs and PCTs, respectively), which makes this dataset
unique in the sense that it is the most detailed longitudinal database at the boiler level
of the Swedish heat and power sector. Installed capacity is used as a proxy for capital in
physical units. With regard to labor, the data at company level were gathered from Retriever
Bolagsinfo. For multi-unit plants, we allocated labor to generating units according to their
generating capacity ratio.20
15 The Tn -statistic of Li et al. (2009) can be used in a broader perspective to test equality of distributions with
mixed and continuous data. The test of equality of two density functions is just a particular case of it. Unlike
the T -statistic of Li (1996, 1999), the T -statistic of Li et al. (2009) is not sensitive to the ordering of the data.
16 A high-efficiency CHP can use 10% less fuel than that required to produce the same quantities of heat and
electricity separately (Swedish Energy Agency 2009).
17 District heating is an energy network that supplies and spreads heat to homes and other facilities. Heat is
produced by a group of boilers in a central plant burning a range of different fuels, and then distributed through
pipelines to customers.
18 Although our variable of installed capacity does not account directly for the capital invested to abate NOx
emissions, this variable partially and indirectly considers the likelihood of carrying out abatement investments
since PCTs and CTs are strongly dependent on boiler size.
19 A vast literature reports the heat content in the fuel in Btu units; however for simplicity we have expressed
fuel input in MWh since the NOx charge system makes use of MWh as its fundamental unit of data analysis.
20 Assuming that labor is proportional to generating capacity is common in the literature (see e.g., Färe
et al. 2005; Agee et al. 2014). Themotivation for including labor as an input in the production process is that the
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Although we have CO2 values accessed from the SEPA’s EU ETS database, their aggre-
gation at installation level prevents us from recovering the emissions for each boiler. Instead,
CO2 emissions are estimated based on available data on the boilers’ energy fuel shares and
emission factors per fuel type. Hence, we can recover the total input energy that corresponds
to the amount of fuel consumed per boiler. In addition, our dataset comprises a wide range
of fuel types, i.e., gas, oil, coal, peat, biofuel, and waste. We use emission factors for each
fuel classification.21 However, this method only considers emissions derived from fuel use
for combustion and excludes emissions coming from raw materials,22 which—unlike other
industries—are not significant in the case of the heat and power generation.23
We focus on boilers that operate every year. This group of generating units represents the
operation of the sector under normal or standard conditions, i.e., we exclude boilers that may
only be switched on under certain circumstances (e.g., as backup during episodes of very
cold winters). Two boilers for which information on fuel shares is missing are dropped. One
boiler that uses a combination of mixed refinery gas and gas converted during the process
is also excluded due to the complexity of the fuel and its extremely high emissions. Finally,
our sample consists of a panel of 82 boilers distributed across 35 firms (738 observations, of
which 328 are for the period 2001–2004 and 410 are for 2005–2009).
Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1. As we can see, there
is large variation in emission rates among boilers. CO2 emission rates vary from zero to
428.5 tons/GWh, while NOx emission rates vary almost 20-fold from 0.03 to 0.68 tons/GWh.
This reflects differences within the sector in fuel mix, fuel usage, boiler size, and availability
of NOx abatement technologies.
5 Results
In this section, we describe and analyze the results of our estimates of technical efficiencies,
elasticities of substitution, and shadow prices.
5.1 Technical Efficiency and Technical Progress
The estimated coefficients of the quadratic directional output distance function are shown in
Table 2, and Tables 5 and 6 in the “Appendix” verify that the coefficients are consistent with
monotonicity, concavity, and null-jointness constraints.
Footnote 20 continued
implementation of NOx abatement measures requires qualified human capital. Moreover, as pointed out by
Sterner and Turnheim (2009), direct real-time measurement of NOx emissions is very important as simple
rules of thumb are not useful, and not even the engineers themselves know the emissions levels unless they
are continuously monitored.
21 Each type of fuel has some sub-classifications. For instance, gas may include natural gas, LPG, and biogas,
oil may include no. 1 and no. 5 fuel oil as well as bio-oil, and biofuel may include several kinds of residues
from the forest and other types of biomass. Specific emission factors for every sub-classification have been
considered to develop the estimations (see emission factors in SEPA 2009).
22 Raw materials in this context are primary substances or goods, different than fuels, used as feedstocks
in the production process to be transformed and generate industrial products, e.g., chemicals or metals. We
acknowledge that the carbon content in those substances may not be negligible.
23 For comparison purposes, we also estimated the CO2 emissions using the total output per boiler, adjusting
it by boiler efficiency to obtain the input energy and distributing it across fuels by means of the energy fuel
shares. Another check involved the comparison of the sum of the estimated emissions per installation and
the corresponding aggregated emissions in the SEPA’s EU ETS database for some installations where such
aggregation was possible. In both cases, our estimations were in a similar order of magnitude.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
2001–2004
Y Useful energy (MWh) 239,286 227,590 26,119 1,292,804
b1 CO2 (tons) 25,098 53,406 6.5 350,320
b2 NOx (tons) 46.7 33.9 4.4 185.8
b1/Y CO2 (tons)/GWh 81.4 120.7 0.2 428.5
b2/Y NOx (tons)/GWh 0.25 0.09 0.03 0.56
x1 Installed capacity (MW) 72.3 80.2 6 600
x2 Fuel consumption (MWh) 253,096 237,637 23,642 1,247,052
x3 Labor (no. of employees) 36.6 41.5 1 200
2005–2009
Y Useful energy (MWh) 242,729 253,471 25,091 1,232,591
b1 CO2 (tons) 20,575 56,114 0 382,960
b2 NOx (tons) 42.5 32.0 5.0 192.2
b1/Y CO2 (tons)/GWh 69.7 119.0 0 427.3
b2/Y NOx (tons)/GWh 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.68
x1 Installed capacity (MW) 70.7 77.5 6 600
x2 Fuel consumption (MWh) 255,025 266,095 23,726 1,334,877
x3 Labor (no. of employees) 44.4 43.0 2 211
Stringent environmental regulations have a positive effect not only on environmental
quality but also possibly on firms’ absolute performance if they induce development of new
technologies and a more efficient use of resources. Compliance costs due to stricter envi-
ronmental regulations make environmentally friendlier technological development relatively
less costly. This should be represented by an outward shift of the production possibility curve
or an inward shift in the input coefficient space, whichmeans that with a given set of resources
it is now possible to produce more goods and services without worsening the environmental
quality (Xepapadeas and Zeeuw 1999).
Our results from the Swedish CHP plants are a case in point and indicate the existence
of significant technical progress. We compute the frontier for the years 2001 and 2009 (the
initial and final years in our sample) using our PLP coefficient estimates. The frontiers are
obtained for a generating unit using themean values of inputs in both periods. The normalized
values of inputs of this generating unit are substituted into the directional output distance
function leading to an expression that only depends on the good and bad outputs.We solve this
equation for values of the good output thatmake the directional output distance function equal
to zero (i.e., no technical inefficiency). The frontiers are plotted allowing for a grid of values
of both pollutants. As shown in Fig. 2, technological progress drives a significant movement
of the frontier towards reduced emissions of both pollutants, though as expected the overall
reduction is biased towards CO2 emission reduction. The movement of the frontier itself is
consistent with the fact that the amount of heat and power generation per unit of emissions
increases for both pollutants between periods, but the efficiency increase is greater in the case
of CO2. We could thus say that the technical change is “carbon saving” in much the same
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Table 2 Parameter estimates of the quadratic directional output distance function using the parametric linear
programming approach (g = 1, 1, 1)
Coefficients Variable Before EU ETS 2001–2004 After EU ETS 2005–2009
α0 Intercept 0.005 0.008
α1 x1 −0.127 −0.039
α2 x2 0.737 0.610
α3 x3 0.060 −0.016
β1 y −0.777 −0.745
θ1 b1 0.020 0.012




α12 x1x2 −0.178 −0.204
















η11 x1b1 −0.0004 0.004
η21 x2b1 0.011 −0.007
η31 x3b1 −0.001 0.011
η12 x1b2 0.103 0.089
η22 x2b2 0.178 0.248
η32 x3b2 0.029 −0.046
μ1 yb1 −0.002 0.000
μ2 yb2 −0.157 −0.129
θ12 b1b2 0.001 0.0001
δ1 x1y 0.102 0.093
δ2 x2y 0.189 0.241








Number of observations 328 410
Satisfy concavity in (y, b1, b2) Yes Yes
x1 = installed capacity, x2 = fuel consumption, x3 = labor, y =useful energy, b1 = CO2, and b2 = NOx.
Years 2001 and 2005 are the reference cases for each estimation period respectively, so that τ1 and τ5 coef-
ficients are absorbed by the intercept α0. Estimations include firm fixed effects, but their coefficients are not
shown in the table
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Fig. 2 Frontiers in 2001 and 2009. Note The frontiers are obtained for a generating unit using the mean
values of inputs in both periods. The normalized values of inputs of this generating unit are substituted into the
directional output distance function leading to an expression that only depends on the good and bad outputs.
The plots are expressed in original units multiplying the normalized values by the corresponding means of
good and bad outputs
way as traditionally technical changes often have been characterized as “labor saving.”24 On
average, CO2 emissions per GWh by CHP plants decreased by 15% between the periods
(from 81.4 in 2001–2004 to 69.7 ton/GWh in 2005–2009) and by approximately 5% for NOx
(from 0.245 to 0.232 ton/GWh).
Thus far we have analyzed technical progress at the frontier. We are also interested in the
performance of all firms, which is conveniently measured by studying technical efficiency
relative to each respective frontier: We find that out of 82 boilers of the sample, 45 were
found to operate at least once on the frontier during 2001–2004 and 44 at least once on the
frontier during 2005–2009. Thirty-three boilers were found to operate on the frontier at least
one of the years in each of the two periods.
The estimations of technical and environmental efficiency yield mean inefficiency values
of 14.86 and 17.68% for the pre- and post-introduction periods of the EUETS, respectively.25
This indicates that during 2001–2004, boilers on average could have expanded heat and
power generation by 35.56 GWh (i.e., 239.3×14.86%) and contracted CO2 emissions by
3730 tons (25,098×14.86%) and NOx emissions by 6.94 tons (46.7×14.86%) if they would
have adopted the best practice of frontier-generating units. Similarly, in 2005–2009 boilers
on average could have increased their production by 42.91GWh and decreased CO2 and
NOx emissions by 3638 and 7.51 tons, respectively, if the generating units were to operate
efficiently.26 Given these results, the amount of possible reduction in emissions and increase
24 We mean by “carbon saving” the same as “reducing net system emissions of CO2”. We assume that the
biomass is sustainably grown and leads to no (or low) CO2 emissions. Thus, reducing carbon emissions is
here largely synonymous with “fossil-fuel saving” or “biomass using”.
25 The firm fixed-effect coefficients were in general different from zero; i.e., on average, a set of CHP units
belonging to specific firms tend to be much closer or farther to the best-practice frontier than the group of
CHP units of the reference firm.
26 We also analyzed the sensitivity of our estimations to the heterogeneity in the number of plants per firm.
In our dataset we have firms with one, two, or seven plants. We estimated Eq. (2) adding two dummy variables:
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in heat and power generation that could have been achieved between periods following the
practice of the most efficient generating units is of considerable magnitude. The bootstrapped
Li et al. (2009) Tn-statistic allows us to compare the inefficiency distributions between periods
and conclude that the boilers are statistically equally efficient in the two periods at the 10%
significance level.
If we compare inefficiencies by fuel type, we find that the highest technical and environ-
mental efficiencies are reached by boilers usingmainly biofuelwhile the highest inefficiencies
are found for boilers burning mainly fossil fuels. For instance, average inefficiencies for boil-
ers with biofuel shares exceeding 80% are 9.64% for 2001–2004 and 13.60% for 2005–2009
whereas the corresponding numbers for boilers with fossil fuel shares exceeding 80% are
36.37 and 33.42%, respectively. In the case of fossil fuels, the bootstrapped Li et al. (2009)
test indicates that the differences between periods are not statistically significant, while in the
case of biofuels the test indicates that inefficiencies tend to increase in the period 2005–2009
(p value=0.056).
When it comes to the availability of NOx abatement technologies, we find that the inef-
ficiencies are larger for boilers that use only PCTs (22.27% in 2001–2004 vs. 27.37% in
2005–2009) compared with boilers that use only CTs (11.11% in 2001–2004 vs. 15.21% in
2005–2009). As discussed in Sect. 2, PCTs usually require energy thatmight lead to increased
CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 3, we find a significant correlation between
the type of NOx technology installed and the boiler size. Indeed, if we classify boilers accord-
ing to size, we observe that the incidence of CTs (whose investment cost is lower) is greater
among small boilers compared with PCTs, which are more expensive and mostly adopted by
large boilers (alone or in combinationwithCTs).27 The incidence of biofuel use is also greater
among small boilers. Moreover, these boilers tend to minimize the use of fossil fuels to the
largest possible extent by using alternative fuels such as peat and waste, which were exempt
from CO2 taxation at certain times during the period 2001–2009. Overall, these findings
suggest that smaller boilers substitute pollutants by means of the choice of fuel while larger
boilers substitute by adopting NOx-reducing technologies, which is a reflection of the fact
that the production process of large boilers is relatively more inflexible and—as discussed in
the following section—less sensitive to variations in the relative price of CO2/NOx.
5.2 Output-CO2 and Output-NOx Elasticities
With regard to the pollution-good output elasticities, Fig. 3a, b illustrate the kernel distribu-
tions between the two periods (and report the mean values, standard deviation, and p-value
of the nonparametric test). As expected, the pollution-good output elasticities are negative,
implying that the emission intensity decreases when the relative shadow price of emissions
to output increases. When it comes to CO2, the mean CO2-output elasticity changed from
−0.420 to −0.176 between the periods. That is, substitution increased since lower pollution-
Footnote 26 continued
a dummy that takes the value of one for firms with seven plants (and zero otherwise); and a dummy that
takes the value of one for firms with one plant (and zero otherwise). The group of firms with two plants is
the reference case. We then compared the density functions of the inefficiency scores of the models with and
without dummy variables for the number of plants per firm. For both periods (2001–2004 and 2005–2009) we
were not able to reject the null hypothesis that the inefficiency-scores density functions are equal at the 10%
significance level. This suggests that controlling for the number of plants per firm does not have a statistically
significant impact on the results.
27 Size is proxied by installed capacity.Generating unitswith installed capacity below themedian are classified
as small boilers and boilers with installed capacity above the median are classified as large boilers.
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2001-2004: Mean= -0.420 Sd= 0.342
2005-2009: Mean= -0.176 Sd= 0.238
p-value: 0.000
2001-2004: Mean= -1.823 Sd= 8.090




Fig. 3 a Kernel distribution of CO2-output elasticities. b kernel distribution of NOx-output elasticities. Note
Elasticities lower than −8.5 are not shown for convenience of presentation
good output elasticities in absolute values indicate greater substitution possibilities. Using the
Li et al. (2009) test, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of equality between the density
functions of the pollution-good output elasticities pre- and post-introduction of the EU ETS
for CO2. An explanation for the increased substitution is technological development. Indeed,
the results in the previous section indicate that several technical measures were implemented
in order to reduce CO2 emissions. The trend towards phasing out of fossil fuels in Sweden has
been quite stable over the sampled period and most firms in the sector have already switched
to “carbon-free” fuels. For instance, during the period 2005–2009 the fraction of boilers with
biofuel shares greater than or equal to 80% was approximately 63%, while the fraction of
boilers usingmainly fossil fuels was around 11% (see Table 3). As discussed before, there are
clear differences between small and large boilers; the Morishima elasticities of substitution
indicate greater substitution among small boilers (e.g., a CO2-output elasticity of −0.243
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and −0.076 for the first and second period versus −0.634 and −0.309 for large boilers).
Consequently, the CO2 emission intensity of small boilers is lower than that of large boilers.
The mean absolute value of the NOx-output elasticity also decreased between the pre- and
post-EU ETS periods (from −1.823 to −0.676), indicating greater substitution. The test that
compares the density functions of the elasticities before and after the introduction of the EU
ETS indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the two distributions
at the 1% significance level. This result might be explained by the fact that the fraction of
generating units without any NOx abatement measure declined between the periods from 21
to 17% and also that the simultaneous adoption of more than one NOx reduction technology
increased from 19 to 27% (see Table 3). The decrease in absolute value of these elasticities for
the period 2005–2009 would suggest that the easiest emission reductions have already been
undertaken. Therefore further reductions of NOx per unit of output will only be supported
by much higher charges for NOx emissions. NOx emission reductions have certainly been
achieved since the NOx charge was implemented yet the slow pace of these reductions
relative to CO2 during the last decade also reflects an inclination to rather favor CO2 than
NOx emission reductions.
When it comes to NOx-output elasticity by size, our results indicate greater substitution
among small boilers than among large boilers. For small boilers, the NOx-output elasticity is
−0.564 and −0.360 for the first and second period, respectively, versus −3.348 and −1.100
for large boilers.
5.3 CO2–NOx Substitution
One main purpose of this study is to assess the existence of substitutability between CO2 and
NOx. Our results indicate that CO2 and NOx are substitutes. Like in the case of pollution-
good output elasticities, lower absolute values of the Morishima elasticities of substitution
indicate greater substitution possibilities between pollutants. Hence, substitution increased
during the period 2005–2009. For instance, the mean estimates of the Morishima CO2–NOx
elasticity correspond to 1.706 for 2001–2004 and 0.472 for 2005–2009. The mean estimates
of the corresponding NOx–CO2 elasticity are 0.446 for 2001–2004 and 0.004 for 2005–2009.
The asymmetry of the elasticities indicates that it is easier to substitute CO2 with NOx
than NOx with CO2. In other words, firms are much more sensitive to variations in CO2
prices and therefore more willing to decrease CO2 emissions at the expense of increasing
NOx emissions rather than the other way around. Clearly, this is linked to the fact that CO2
emissions have a much higher opportunity cost than NOx emissions. As mentioned before, a
policy implication that could be derived from here is that—given the high opportunity costs
of CO2 emissions—the NOx fee would have to be increased to a higher level than its current
value in order to achieve large NOx emission reductions. An alternative implication has to do
with the choice of policy instruments as the effects of climate policy onNOx emissions depend
crucially on the environmental regulation of NOx. In particular, NOx emissions change in
response to climate policy since NOx is subject to price regulation. If NOx instead would be
subject to, for instance, an emissions cap-and-trade system, then climate policy would not
change NOx emissions but would change the price of permits in the NOx market.
Kernel distributions of the elasticities between pollutants are depicted in Fig. 4a, b. Using
the bootstrapped Li et al. (2009) Tn-statistics, we tested the null hypothesis of equal density
functions between the pre- and post-implementation period of the EU ETS. We reject this
null hypothesis; the elasticity of CO2–NOx substitution does tend to shift towards the left-
hand side of the distribution, indicating greater substitution in 2005–2009 than in 2001–2004.
In the case of the NOx–CO2 elasticity, we also observe that for many generating units the
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2001-2004: Mean= 1.706 Sd= 7.815
2005-2009: Mean= 0.472 Sd= 0.868
p-value: 0.000
2001-2004: Mean= 0.446 Sd= 1.231




Fig. 4 a Kernel distribution of CO2–NOx elasticities. Note Elasticities greater than 6 are not shown for
convenience of presentation, b kernel distribution of elasticities NOx–CO2. Note Elasticities greater than 0.6
are not shown for convenience of presentation
estimates are concentrated around zero. Further CO2–NOx substitution has increased because
most firms have implemented technical measures to allow for this substitution to take place
(they have in fact undertaken a complete transition to biofuels).
The asymmetric substitution is also observed when classifying by boiler size. Among
small boilers, it is easier to substitute NOx for CO2 than CO2 for NOx, e.g., the value of
the CO2–NOx elasticity for small boilers is 0.699 and 0.340 for the first and second period,
respectively, versus 0.172 and 0.001 for the NOx–CO2 elasticity. Similar evidence is found
for large boilers; the value of the CO2–NOx elasticity is 2.926 and 0.648 for the first and
second period versus 0.777 and 0.008 for the NOx–CO2elasticity. Moreover, in line with the
results described in the previous section, in the case of both the CO2–NOx and the NOx–
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CO2 elasticity, we observe that substitution is greater among small boilers than large boilers,
which might be explained by a more inflexible production process for large boilers.
5.4 Shadow Prices
Finally, we compute the absolute and relative shadow prices. When it comes to the absolute
shadow prices, we follow Färe et al.’s (2005) approach and assume that the price of heat and
power is known (and equal to its shadow price).We proxy the price of heat and power through
the annual price of district heating reported by the Swedish EnergyAgency. The average price
corresponds to 56.6e/MWh for the period 2001–2004 and 61.7e/MWh for the period 2005–
2009.28 Based on our estimates of the derivatives Dy and Dbi , the shadow prices of CO2
and NOx for the period 2001–2004 correspond to 5.33 and 80,136e/ton, respectively. The
shadowprices for the period2005–2009 are significantly higher (which supports the claim that
the easiest emission reductions have already been undertaken) at 19.23 and 129,556e/ton,
respectively. Furthermore, there is a very small (though statistically significant) increase in
the shadow price of CO2/NOx from a mean of 0.00018 in 2001–2004 to a mean of 0.00019
in 2005–200929 (Fig. 5.).
The sumof theCO2 tax (net of deductions) plus theEUETSprice corresponded to 52e/ton
in 2001–2004 and 33.4e/ton in 2005–2009. The price of the NOx charge corresponded to
3766.5 and 4143.1e/ton, respectively. Hence, in terms ofe/ton, the regulatory relative prices
of CO2/NOx decreased from a mean of 0.014 to a mean of 0.008. Overall, these estimates
suggest that, in relative terms, the relative shadow price of CO2/NOx emissions is lower than
the regulatory relative price. The comparison of absolute prices indicates that with regard to
the prices of the regulations, CO2 has been cheaper to reduce while the reverse holds for NOx.
This is consistent with our previous claim that in order to achieve further NOx reductions,
the NOx fee has to be increased to a greater extent.
5.5 The Choice of the Directional Vector
One important advantage of the directional distance function is the possibility to analyze
efficiency by increasing good outputswhile simultaneously decreasing bad outputs. However,
the wide range of possible directions allows for a great deal of subjectivity regarding the
importance of the production of the good output and the abatement of bad output. So far we
have assumed that pollution reduction is regarded as an equally important target as the increase
of good output. Moreover, we assume that CO2 abatement is regarded as equally important as
NOx abatement. Nevertheless, as discussed by Agee et al. (2014), increasing output might be
regarded as more important than reducing emissions. Furthermore, in line with the discussion
in Sect. 2, since the transition to a carbon-free economy is as key environmental goal of the
Swedish government, it is reasonable to assume that CO2 abatement is regarded as more
important than NOx abatement. Hence, in this section, we develop a sensitivity analysis
estimating the elasticities of substitution and efficiency for two additional direction sets,
28 These prices ranged from 52.6 to 61.0e/MWh during the period 2001–2004 and from 61.0 to 62.2e/MWh
in 2005–2009. These prices are converted to units of 2009 constant euros. We use the Sweden Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and an exchange rate of 10.62SEK/e.
29 Note that the mean relative shadow price differs from the quotient between the means of the absolute
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2001-2004: Mean= 0.00018 Sd=0.00091
2005-2009: Mean= 0.00019 Sd=0.00020
p-value: 0.000
Fig. 5 Kernel distribution of relative shadow prices of CO2/NOx, Note Relative shadow price estimates
greater than 0.0032 are not shown for convenience of presentation
namely (1.2, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 0.8).30 The first vector represents the case where the increase in
good output is 20% more important than a decrease in pollution and the second represents
the case where reducing CO2 emissions is as important as increasing output and 25% more
important than a decrease in NOx emissions.
Table 4 shows that our results are generally robust to the choice of the direction vector.
For instance, CO2 and NOx are substitutes regardless of the directional vector and NOx–CO2
substitution increases post-EUETS implementation.Moreover,when it comes to inefficiency,
the differences between periods remain statistically insignificant, though (interestingly) the
level of the inefficiencies tend to be lower when there is a greater focus on good output instead
of pollution, i.e., the directional vector (1.2, 1, 1) instead of vectors (1, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 0.8).
The magnitude of the absolute shadow prices of CO2 and NOx for the period 2005–2009
tends to be lower under vectors (1.2, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 0.8) than under vector (1, 1, 1). Regarding
relative prices, under the directional vector (1, 1, 0.8), the relative shadow price of CO2/NOx
is statistically lower for the period 2005–2009 than for the period 2001–2004. Note that
for this vector, NOx abatement is less important than CO2 abatement. The reduction in the
relative shadow price is consistent with the reduction in the relative price of the regulation. As
a robustness check we also estimated the shadow prices and elasticities of substitution for the
same set of directional vectors using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and corrected ordinary
least squares (COLS). In line with the PLP results, SFA and COLS showed that CO2 andNOx
are substitutes. The results are not qualitatively sensitive to the estimation technique, however
for observations satisfying technology properties SFA and COLS yielded higher elasticities
and shadowprices (in absolute values) than thePLPmethod (Duet al. 2015a also found similar
results for SFA). A disadvantage of the SFA and COLS methods is that around 74–79% of
the observations simultaneously violated monotonicity in good and undesirable outputs. In
contrast, our PLP results fully satisfy the properties of the underlying technology through
the sample. Finally, for comparison purposes we also estimated inefficiencies using DEA.
30 Some studies have applied optimization methods to endogenously determine optimal directions; see e.g.,
Peyrache and Daraio (2012) and Färe et al. (2013). However, this is outside the scope of this study.
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Table 4 Sensitiveness to the directional vector





CO2-output (1.2, 1, 1) −0.558 −0.123 0.000
(0.701) (0.157)
(1, 1, 0.8) −0.549 −0.113 0.000
(0.519) (0.142)
NOx-output (1.2, 1, 1) −0.994 −0.542 0.012
(2.480) (0.487)
(1, 1, 0.8) −0.896 −0.514 0.054
(2.207) (0.459)
CO2–NOx (1.2, 1, 1) 0.767 0.486 0.178
(2.800) (0.426)
(1, 1, 0.8) 0.748 0.499 0.284
(2.601) (0.427)
NOx–CO2 (1.2, 1, 1) 0.331 0.014 0.010
(1.209) (0.040)
(1, 1, 0.8) 0.304 0.016 0.024
(0.813) (0.046)
Shadow price CO2 (1.2, 1, 1) 7.360 11.928 0.000
(3.478) (7.579)
(1, 1, 0.8) 10.706 11.722 0.000
(5.400) (8.024)
Shadow price NOx (1.2, 1, 1) 81,919 121,489 0.000
(42,921) (75,439)
(1, 1, 0.8) 84,020 121,489 0.000
(44,385) (73,619)
Shadow price CO2/NOx (1.2, 1, 1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.766
(0.0003) (0.0001)
(1, 1, 0.8) 0.0002 0.0001 0.006
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Inefficiency (1.2, 1, 1) 0.130 0.157 0.704
(0.195) (0.228)
(1, 1, 0.8) 0.157 0.190 0.774
(0.231) (0.278)
Table reports mean values. Standard deviations in parentheses
a p value of the nonparametric Li et al. (2009) test assessing the equality between the density functions for
the periods 2001–2004 and 2005–2009
The inefficiencies were much lower in magnitude than those obtained with PLP, indicating
that the output set of the quadratic specification contains the piecewise linear DEA output
possibility set (see Färe et al. 2005).31
31 SFA, COLS and DEA results can be obtained from the authors on request. Regarding the firm fixed-effect
coefficients, in the SFA and COLSmodels we tested the null hypothesis whether those coefficients were jointly
statistically equal to zero. We found that this hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level, indicating that
there are differences in technical efficiency across firms.
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6 Synergies and Trade-Offs Between Reductions of CO2 and NOx
Emissions
Has the overlapping of climate policies brought about increased NOx emissions? Since pol-
lutants are substitutes, we do find a tendency in this direction. However, NOx emissions have
not actually increased in practice as technological development has led to reduced emissions
of both pollutants. Furthermore, contrary to what one may have expected, the regulatory rel-
ative price of CO2/NOx emissions has decreased since harmonization with the EU actually
implied a sizeable fall in the price of carbon emissions for most CHP plants in addition to
the simultaneous increase in the local NOx charge in 2008. This is to say that in relative
terms, CO2 policies in Sweden have become less stringent after the introduction of the EU
ETS due to the variations in the levels of the local policies. A natural question that arises
is what would have happened if the carbon tax had not been phased out. In such a case, the
regulatory relative price (CO2/NOx) per ton during the period 2005–2009 would have been
2.625 times higher (i.e., 0.029 instead of 0.008). Based on our estimates for the CO2–NOx
elasticity for the period 2001–2004, we calculate that the (NOx/CO2) emissions intensity
would have increased from 0.186% in 2001–2004 to 0.520% in 2005–2009. In reality, how-
ever, it increased to a much lower extent than predicted (i.e., 0.207%) due to the combined
effect of technological progress and the fact that the regulatory relative price of CO2/NOx
decreased sharply.
As mentioned in the introduction, some previous studies have found ancillary benefits
from reductions in greenhouse gases in the U.S. For instance, Burtraw et al. (2003) simulate
the effects ofmoderate carbon taxes for electricity production on reductions ofNOx emissions
beyond the requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Their results indicate that
health-related ancillary benefits appear significant relative to the costs of those reductions
and that they should play an important role in facilitating the debate regarding near-term
policies to address the threat of climate change. Similar evidence is provided by Agee et al.
(2014), who report that the marginal effect of reducing NOx on CO2 emissions is positive,
roughly of equal absolute magnitude, and explained by adoption of more efficient production
and pollution control technologies.
How do we reconcile their findings with the findings of our study? We believe that the
differences are explained by several factors, including significant differences in emission
intensity as well as in the type and stringency of the regulations in place. For instance, infor-
mation provided byMekaroonreung and Johnson (2012) for a sample of 336 U.S. bituminous
coal-burning electricity plants over the period 2000–2008 indicates that the average CO2 and
NOx emissions were 922.56 and 1.790 tons/GWh, respectively. By contrast, the average
CO2 and NOx emission intensities in our sample were 74.87 and 0.238 tons/GWh. As dis-
cussed in Sect. 2, the low emission intensity of Swedish CHP plants is the result of very
ambitious national policies with extremely high stringency levels compared with those in
the U.S. Stringent policies have yielded significant reductions in emissions, putting Swedish
plants in a situation where there is no slack or low-hanging fruit that will increase general
efficiency and thus cut emissions of both pollutants. Instead, as indicated by our results, if
further CO2 emission reductions are to be achieved we would expect hard tradeoffs in the
form of increases in NOx emission intensities. Finally, there is a difference when it comes to
the type of NOx regulations in place. In the U.S., NOx regulations generally take the form of
tradable permits while Sweden has chosen to control NOx emissions through a refundable
fee. As shown by Ambec and Coria (2013), under price regulation firms modify their abate-
ment levels of both pollutants in response to an increased stringency of climate policy, while
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if NOx were regulated through quantity regulations we would only observe an increase in
the marginal cost of reducing NOx without any effects on the level of emissions.
7 Conclusions
The implementation of environmental policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
does not only have a global impact, but can also bring local co-benefits (or costs) by reducing
(increasing) other air pollutants due to complementarity or substitution. These interactions
have clear implications for policy design as many European countries are committed to reach
the Kyoto obligations and there are currently multiple policies in place aiming to reduce
CO2 emissions. The question is what ancillary benefits (costs) we can expect from pursuing
GHG reduction policies and local air pollution policies simultaneously. We explore this
question formally by analyzing the patterns of substitution between CO2 and NOx in the
heat and power sector in Sweden induced by the interaction of national and international
environmental policies.
We model the pollution technology of generating units in the Swedish heat and power
sector as a non-separable production process where CO2, NOx, and production are treated as
joint outputs.We use a directional output distance function that accounts for the simultaneous
expansion of good outputs and contraction of bad outputs, which is a fair representation of
the problem that many regulated firms deal with. We choose a quadratic representation of
the technology and subsequently derive the estimates of elasticities between CO2 and NOx
and heat and power generation. Through this method, we characterize changes in the relative
performance of Swedish combined heat and power (CHP) plantswith respect toCO2 andNOx
emissions in response to variations in the level of stringency of CO2 and NOx policies and
multiple layers of regulation. To evaluate the change in elasticities or relative shadow prices,
we compare the probability distributions between the periods 2001–2004 (pre-introduction
of the EU ETS) and 2005–2009 (post-introduction) by means of a kernel consistent density
test.
Our results indicate that there are important interactions between the abatement efforts for
CO2 and NOx. Indeed, we find that in the combined heat and power generation sector, CO2
and NOx are substitutes, implying that regulatory efforts that limit emissions of one pollutant
might have the unintended consequence of increasing the other pollutant. Overall, the degree
of substitution for CHP plants between these two pollutants increases after the introduction
of the EU ETS in response to technological development and regulatory changes that led to
a reduced relative price of CO2/NOx.
Our results also indicate that CO2 is more sensitive than NOx to prices, which means
that if the regulator is to encourage a large reduction in NOx emissions, the charge must be
increased to a much higher level than the present. This is also confirmed by our estimates of
the shadow price of NOx, which is much higher than the current value of the NOx fee. It is
also consistent with the fact that technological development has been biased towards CO2
emission reductions, implying that it has become easier to reduce CO2 emissions than NOx
emissions per unit of output.
Finally, our results are robust to choice of directional vectors. The fact that generating
units respond to variation in the relative prices of emissions by changing the intensity of their
abatement efforts suggests that there is a need for policy coordination to avoid unintended
effects of one policy instrument on the emissions of other pollutants. This is particularly
important if abatement of climate and local air pollutants are substitutes since the unintended
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costs of climate policy in the form of local pollution can make it less acceptable to the public
and policymakers. This is an area where much research is needed since we are experiencing a
polycentric approach to climate change with mitigation and adaptation activities undertaken
by multiple policy actors at a range of different levels. Furthermore, a caveat of our analysis
is that our dataset only includes generating units of the heat and power sector. Nevertheless,
different industrial sectors might differ significantly in terms of the relative burden of local
and global air pollution regulations. Thus, even though the analysis of the variations in
technical complementarity/substitutability across industries is beyond the scope of the study
it is suggested as a relevant area for further research.
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See Tables 5 and 6.
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